Forbes: Quantum Technology Threatens Crypto? It’s More Likely an Opportunity
Forbes: Quantum Technology Threatens Crypto? It’s More Likely an Opportunity
Crypto rarely gets to choose when its next security debate arrives. In 2025 and early 2026, the industry has already been navigating volatile macro conditions, geopolitics, regulatory pressure, and periodic market deleveraging. Now a familiar topic is back with renewed urgency: quantum computing—and the sense that the practical timeline is moving forward.
A recent Forbes commentary (original title: Quantum Advances Are An Opportunity For Crypto, by Sean Stein Smith; translated by Foresight News) frames the moment in a constructive way: quantum is not just a threat narrative—it’s a forcing function that can modernize crypto security, accelerate standards adoption, and differentiate serious infrastructure from “good enough” security. (forbes.com)
Below is a builder and user-focused take on what’s actually changing, what’s not, and why “quantum readiness” may become one of the most investable security themes in the next cycle.
1) What changed: the timeline conversation got real
In March 2026, Google publicly set a 2029 timeline for completing its own post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration efforts—explicitly citing accelerating progress in quantum hardware, quantum error correction, and updated resource estimates. (blog.google)
That matters for crypto for two reasons:
- Big tech timelines become industry timelines. When a platform operator moves, standards bodies, vendors, and security teams tend to follow.
- Digital signatures are the pressure point. Blockchains are, at their core, signature machines: ownership, authorization, and consensus all lean on public-key cryptography.
Google’s position also aligns with a broader reality emphasized by national security agencies: PQC migration is a multi-year program, and waiting for a “confirmed Q-Day” is not a plan. (ncsc.gov.uk)
2) What quantum computing threatens in crypto (and what it doesn’t)
The real target: public-key cryptography used for signatures
Most major public blockchains rely on elliptic-curve signatures (for example, ECDSA- or EdDSA-family schemes) to prove that a transaction is authorized by the private key holder. A cryptographically relevant quantum computer would, in principle, be able to attack the underlying hard problems that today’s public-key cryptography depends on. (ncsc.gov.uk)
If signatures can be forged, the implications range from wallet theft (for keys whose public keys are exposed) to systemic issues like identity and authentication failures across the broader ecosystem.
The “store now, decrypt later” issue is real—but mostly off-chain
Quantum risk is often introduced via “store now, decrypt later”: attackers collect encrypted traffic today, then decrypt it years later when quantum capabilities mature. Google highlights this as a present-day motivation for migrating encryption-in-transit to PQC. (security.googleblog.com)
For public blockchains, most on-chain data is already public—so the more direct concern is signatures and long-lived keys, plus the off-chain stack that crypto depends on (RPC traffic, custody operations, governance communications, exchange infrastructure, institutional settlement rails, etc.).
What quantum doesn’t “instantly break”: symmetric cryptography (with caveats)
A useful nuance: quantum does not “erase cryptography.” Symmetric encryption is not impacted in the same way; in many cases, increasing key sizes can mitigate quantum speedups. Google explicitly notes symmetric cryptography is “notably not affected” in the same way as RSA / ECDH-style public-key systems. (security.googleblog.com)
3) Why this is an opportunity (the Forbes thesis, made practical)
The strongest version of the “opportunity” argument is not marketing—it’s engineering economics:
Opportunity A: A credible reason to upgrade crypto’s security layer
Crypto already has a culture of shipping protocol upgrades. Quantum pressure can accelerate:
- signature agility (supporting new signature schemes without redesigning the whole chain),
- key rotation norms (treating key migration as standard operations, not an emergency),
- better wallet hygiene (address management, reduced key exposure, safer signing paths).
Google’s PQC guidance emphasizes precisely these “crypto agility” practices: inventorying cryptography usage, enabling key rotation, and using abstraction layers so algorithm changes don’t require rewriting everything. (security.googleblog.com)
Opportunity B: Standards are here—deployment is the missing link
A common misconception is that PQC is “still theoretical.” It isn’t.
In August 2024, NIST released finalized post-quantum standards (covering key establishment and signatures), enabling organizations to deploy PQC on classical computers today. (nist.gov)
And in March 2025, NIST selected HQC as an additional “backup” post-quantum encryption algorithm to diversify the toolbox—explicitly to reduce dependency risk if weaknesses are found in a single approach. (nist.gov)
For crypto builders, this standardization arc is valuable: it reduces the chance that each chain invents a bespoke, incompatible security plan.
Opportunity C: “Mainstream platforms” are shipping PQC—and crypto can borrow the playbook
Google’s Android security team announced PQC work landing in Android 17, including ML-DSA integration and hybrid signing approaches designed for migration at ecosystem scale. (security.googleblog.com)
Crypto can mirror this pattern:
- Hybrid authorization (classical + PQC) during transition
- Gradual migration with compatibility layers
- Clear “upgrade windows” that avoid panic-driven hard forks
4) What builders can do now (without waiting for quantum hardware)
Quantum preparedness is mostly software and coordination work. Here’s a practical checklist for protocols, wallets, and dApps.
4.1 Design for cryptographic agility
If your stack hardcodes “one signature algorithm forever,” you’re already behind. Consider:
- Abstracting signature verification behind upgradeable interfaces
- Supporting multiple verification methods (especially in account abstraction or smart contract wallets)
- Building operational tooling for key rotation and recovery
This is the same migration mindset recommended by major security teams preparing for PQC. (security.googleblog.com)
4.2 Start experimenting with PQC and hybrid schemes
You don’t have to flip a global switch. Start with:
- testnets and devnets,
- opt-in account types,
- hybrid transaction formats,
- PQC-secured firmware and signing infrastructure (especially for critical services).
The Android 17 plan is a strong example of “ship PQC in layers” rather than attempting a single dramatic cutover. (security.googleblog.com)
4.3 Treat dormant keys and long-lived identities as high risk
The longer a key is intended to live, the more valuable it becomes to an attacker in a future where quantum resources are scarce but decisive—Google highlights signature transitions as complex partly because signature keys tend to be long-lived and widely embedded. (security.googleblog.com)
5) What users should care about in 2026 (and what to ignore)
Retail users don’t need to become cryptographers, but they do need to interpret headlines correctly.
Don’t panic-move funds because of a quantum headline
The credible risk is about future capability plus slow migration, not about “your wallet gets drained tomorrow.”
Do adopt habits that make future migrations easier
- Avoid unnecessary address reuse where possible
- Prefer wallets and apps that can evolve with protocol upgrades
- Expect more discussions about “PQC-ready addresses,” “hybrid signatures,” and “signature scheme upgrades” in the next few years
Understand that governments and large orgs are already planning multi-year migrations
For example, the UK’s NCSC frames PQC migration as a mass technology change and publishes milestone targets (2028, 2031, 2035) to structure real programs. (ncsc.gov.uk)
Whether your timeline matches theirs or Google’s, the message is consistent: start earlier than you think you need to.
6) Where a hardware wallet fits (and where it doesn’t)
A hardware wallet can’t magically make today’s signature algorithms “quantum-proof.” What it can do is reduce the largest day-to-day risk in crypto: key theft via malware, phishing, or compromised endpoints—the threats users actually face in 2026.
In a quantum-transition world, the most useful wallet traits are:
- Private keys kept off the internet-connected device (clean signing boundary)
- Clear, human-verifiable transaction confirmation (reduces social-engineering loss)
- Ongoing firmware and software support (so users can adopt new address types or signing standards as ecosystems upgrade)
That is also why products like OneKey are positioned for the next phase of crypto security: not because quantum is “here,” but because serious users will increasingly demand tools that are secure today and adaptable tomorrow.
Conclusion: quantum fear is cheap—quantum readiness is a moat
The market doesn’t reward abstract threats for long. But it does reward teams that turn threats into roadmaps.
Quantum advances are pushing the industry toward:
- standardized post-quantum cryptography, (nist.gov)
- accelerated enterprise migration timelines, (blog.google)
- and real deployments in mainstream platforms. (security.googleblog.com)
For crypto, that’s not the end of the story—it’s a rare chance to upgrade security assumptions before the cost of doing so becomes existential.
If you’re building: prioritize crypto agility and hybrid migration paths.
If you’re holding: focus on reducing present-day key compromise risk—and use security tools (including hardware wallets) that can evolve as the ecosystem evolves.
